On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

On the temporal Boundaries of elemental Experiences bunco I argue that the temporal boundaries of certain experiences those I call sincere experiential stillts (SEEs) have a different fictional character than the temporal boundaries of the events virtually frequently associated with experience nervous events. In particular, I argue that the temporal boundaries of SEEs are more(prenominal) sharply defined than those of neural events. Indeed, they are card sharp than the boundaries of all physical events at levels of compoundity high than that of elementary member physics. If correct, it follows that the most common forms of identity theory-functionalism and dualism (according to which neurophysiological (or some other complex) events play mainstay roles through identification or correlation) are mistaken. more positively, the conclusion supports modern approaches that attempt to explain conciousness by appeal to quantum physics. I. universeA methodological analysis that I believe has some chance of providing us with a intermit understanding of the nature of soul or of how it could be that consciousness does non exist, if the eliminativists are right is one in which we playing area our invention or picture of consciousness. Specifically, I am referring to our conception or picture of phenomenal consciousness what one has in mind who, e.g., gets the mind-body problem, understands the invert spectrum or vanish qualia examples, or Nagels phrase that it is comparable something to be conscious, and so on. such(prenominal) individuals, arguably, are thinking about consciousness in a more or less convertible way, exploiting a similar conception or picture, similar conceptual structures. Studying such a conception should be, to a reasonable degree at least, just like mooting each other conception in cognitive science. And, as with other conceptions, the social movement raft be a multidisciplinary one, one to which philosophers can contr ibute. As I said, I think following this route talent lead to win in our understanding of consciousness itself but even if it does not, characterizing our conception of phenomenal consciousness has importance at least as a region of psychology. In any event, it is how I am run to pursue the teach of consciousness these days. This talk describes a small study within that broader project.In another paper (1) I have argued that our conception of phenomenal consciousness commits us to the idea that there are guileless components or elements that in some sense make up our complex phenomenal experience. Actually, it commits us to holding that either there are simples or that our complex phenomenal experience is such that roughly put abstract will eer continue ad infinitum, no matter how a complex phenomenal experience gets carved up.On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences Philosophy Philosophical PapersOn the Temporal Boundaries of Simple ExperiencesABSTRACT I argue that the temporal boundaries of certain experiences those I call simple experiential events (SEEs) have a different character than the temporal boundaries of the events most frequently associated with experience neural events. In particular, I argue that the temporal boundaries of SEEs are more sharply defined than those of neural events. Indeed, they are sharper than the boundaries of all physical events at levels of complexity higher than that of elementary particle physics. If correct, it follows that the most common forms of identity theory-functionalism and dualism (according to which neurophysiological (or other complex) events play key roles through identification or correlation) are mistaken. More positively, the conclusion supports recent approaches that attempt to explain conciousness by appeal to quantum physics. I. IntroductionA methodology that I believe has some chance of providing us with a better understanding of the nature of consciousness or of how it could be that consciousness does not exist, if the eliminativists are right is one in which we study our conception or picture of consciousness. Specifically, I am referring to our conception or picture of phenomenal consciousness what one has in mind who, e.g., gets the mind-body problem, understands the inverted spectrum or absent qualia examples, or Nagels phrase that it is like something to be conscious, and so on. Such individuals, arguably, are thinking about consciousness in a more or less similar way, exploiting a similar conception or picture, similar conceptual structures. Studying such a conception should be, to a reasonable degree at least, just like studying any other conception in cognitive science. And, as with other conceptions, the effort can be a multidisciplinary one, one to which philosophers can contribute. As I said, I think following this route might lead to progress in our understanding of consciousness itself but even if it does not, characterizing our conception o f phenomenal consciousness has importance at least as a piece of psychology. In any event, it is how I am inclined to pursue the study of consciousness these days. This talk describes a small study within that broader project.In another paper (1) I have argued that our conception of phenomenal consciousness commits us to the idea that there are simple components or elements that in some sense make up our complex phenomenal experience. Actually, it commits us to holding that either there are simples or that our complex phenomenal experience is such that roughly put analysis will always continue ad infinitum, no matter how a complex phenomenal experience gets carved up.